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Summary 
The Senior Executive Service (SES) was established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 
(CSRA; P.L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111). Congress created the SES to provide a government-wide, 
mobile corps of managers within federal agencies. The SES, comprising mostly career appointees 
who are chosen through a merit staffing process, is the link between the politically appointed 
heads of agencies and the career civil servants within those agencies. The creators of the SES 
envisioned it as a cadre of high-level managers in the government who would provide leadership 
for agencies across administrations and ensure productivity and efficiency within the government. 
The CSRA incentivized good performance among senior executives by basing their compensation 
on their performance.  
Over the three decades of the SES’s operation, various ideas and suggestions have been offered as 
to how it may be improved. Although a few statutory changes have been implemented since its 
creation, many argue that the current state of the SES calls for more comprehensive reforms. The 
most recent change made to the SES was a revision of its pay system enacted in 2004. Advocates 
for additional changes to the SES argue that further changes would improve the efficiency and the 
management of government programs and the government workforce. Some of the changes they 
call for include improvement in recruiting efforts, more opportunities for onboard training and 
career development of senior executives, and further changes to the current pay structure. 
In the 112th Congress, two bills were introduced that would make significant and sweeping 
changes to the SES. The Senior Executive Service Reform Act, S. 2249, was introduced by 
Senator Daniel Akaka on March 28, 2012. If enacted, S. 2249 would make adjustments to the 
SES pay system, reduce the ratio of noncareer to career senior executives, establish an SES 
Resource Office in the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and require agencies to enhance 
professional development opportunities for senior executives. Representative Jim Moran 
introduced H.R. 6042 on June 27, 2012, also titled the Senior Executive Service Reform Act. 
H.R. 6042 proposed similar changes to those proposed in the Senate bill, and would also require 
agencies to evaluate the skills and qualifications necessary for each SES position when it 
becomes vacant. In addition, H.R. 6042 would require agencies to establish an objective for 
holding executives accountable for addressing employee satisfaction. 
This report provides a history and background of the SES, examines the central features of the 
SES, and discusses some areas in which advocates for SES reform have called for change. 
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he Senior Executive Service (SES) was established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 
1978 (CSRA; P.L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111). Congress created the SES to provide a 
government-wide, mobile corps of managers within federal agencies. The SES, 
comprising mostly career appointees who are chosen through a merit staffing process, is the link 
between the politically appointed heads of agencies and the career civil servants within those 
agencies. The creators of the SES envisioned a cadre of high-level managers in the government 
who would provide leadership for agencies across administrations and ensure productivity and 
efficiency within the government.1 The CSRA incentivized good performance among senior 
executives by basing their compensation on their performance. The CSRA tasked the creation and 
distribution of SES positions within the government to the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM), which was also established by the CSRA.  
The SES was launched in July 1979 and includes most of the government’s managerial and policy 
positions above the General Schedule (GS) grade 15.2 As one government official explained, “the 
SES is the backbone of Federal executive leadership and its members play a crucial role in 
addressing unprecedented challenges facing our nation.”3 More than three decades after its 
existence, the SES still serves as the link between political appointees who run agencies and the 
career government workers in the agencies.  
Before the SES was established, a centralized cadre of senior leaders in the government did not 
exist. The creation of the SES was intended to bring a “measure of coherence” to an otherwise 
fragmented federal bureaucracy. Senior executives would be equipped with managerial skills that 
could allow them to move between agencies to “quell administrative brushfires” and to help 
fulfill agencies’ leadership and management needs.4 
Senior executives serve an important function in high-level government positions, overseeing the 
implementation of many government programs and providing leadership within agencies. 
However, some organizations and individuals have called for changes to the current SES.5 At a 
March 2011 hearing on the SES, for example, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs’ Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce, and the District of Columbia evaluated the current state of the SES. All three 
witnesses at the hearing identified areas they said were in need of improvement in the SES, 
including recruiting, career development, diversity, and the SES pay system.6 
                                                 
1  Sec. 3, P.L. 95-454 
2 Most federal employees are paid on the General Schedule (GS) scale. The GS scale currently consists of 15 pay 
grades. Information about the federal salaries and wages, including the GS scale, is available on OPM’s website at 
http://www.opm.gov/oca/pay/html/FactSheet-SalariesAndWages.asp. 
3 Statement of Jeffrey D. Zients, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 
Strengthening the Senior Executive Service: A Review of Challenges Facing the Government’s Leadership Corps, 112th 
Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 2011, p. 1. 
4 Mark W. Huddleston and William W. Boyer, The Higher Civil Service in the United States: Quest for Reform 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1996), pp. 116-117. 
5 Organizations that have advocated for changes to the SES and are discussed in this report include the Partnership for 
Public Service; the Senior Executives Association, which is the professional association for senior executives; and 
some scholars of public policy. 
6 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Strengthening the Senior Executive 
Service: A Review of Challenges Facing the Government’s Leadership Corps, 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 2011. 
T 
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This report provides a history and background of the SES, examines the central features of the 
SES, and discusses some areas that SES reform advocates have identified as needing 
improvement. 
History of the Senior Executive Service  
The development of the “higher civil service” in the United States throughout the mid-20th 
century led to a class of civil servants in high-level agency positions sometimes referred to as the 
supergrades.7 Supergrades were civil servants who held GS-16, GS-17, and GS-18 positions. 
Congress created the GS scale, including the supergrade positions, in 1949. At that time, the 
number of supergrade positions was limited to 400.8 Individuals in supergrade positions earned 
salaries almost equivalent to those of political executives and Members of Congress. They 
generally held specialized positions within agencies that were technically specific and did not 
require broad leadership skills or mobility. It was these individuals who were converted into the 
Senior Executive Service under the Civil Service Reform Act, along with individuals in 
managerial positions in Executive Levels IV and V.9 Converting those high-level positions into a 
more centralized cadre of managers was intended to make the management of government more 
flexible and efficient. 
Although the SES was created during President Jimmy Carter’s Administration, President Carter 
was not the first President to propose changes to the executive levels of the civil service. Three 
decades earlier, for example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed a Senior Civil Service 
(which he later called the Career Executive Service). This proposal followed a series of 
recommendations made by the Second Hoover Commission, chaired by former President Herbert 
Hoover, which was created in part to identify needs of the U.S. federal personnel system.10 
President John Kennedy and President Lyndon Johnson also showed interest in reforming the 
higher civil service, tasking their administrations with reviewing the federal executive personnel 
system. Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson introduced a new method for filling supergrade 
positions, but as some scholars have pointed out, reactions to and success of the programs were 
mixed.11  
Soon after entering the White House, President Richard Nixon asked the Civil Service 
Commission to study and make recommendations on the state of the federal executive personnel 
system. The study concluded that there were a number of issues with the executive personnel 
system that needed to be addressed. Some recommendations made by the commission included 
improving executive management capabilities; fostering and recruiting from a talent pool of 
motivated individuals; centralizing executive resources across agency lines; and providing 
training for executives.12 These recommendations were incorporated into a proposal by President 
Nixon to establish the Federal Executive Service in 1971. Scholars have identified the political 
                                                 
7 For more information about the development of the higher civil service in the United States throughout the 20th 
century, see Huddleston and Boyer, The Higher Civil Service. 
8 The GS scale was created by the Classification Act of 1949, P.L. 81-429. 
9 Joining the SES was not mandatory, but when the SES officially went into effect on July 13, 1979, over 98.5 % of 
eligible employees chose to convert.  
10 Huddleston and Boyer, Higher Civil Service, pp. 35-50. 
11 Ibid., p. 71. 
12 Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
The Senior Executive Service: Background and Options for Reform 
 
Congressional Research Service 3 
landscape surrounding the Nixon Presidency and a controversial provision which would have 
required executives to enter three-year “employment agreements” as the main reasons why 
Congress did not pass Nixon’s FES bill.13 
Federal Personnel Management Project 
One of the centerpieces of President Carter’s campaign for the presidency in 1976 was his 
“Washington outsider” status, which he used as an asset to address what he considered to be 
problems in the federal government. During his campaign, he criticized the federal bureaucracy 
as being “wasteful” and “disorganized.”14 After his election to the presidency, he created the 
Federal Personnel Management Project to address what he considered to be problems with the 
federal executive establishment. Led by the chair of the Civil Service Commission (now the 
Office of Personnel Management) and the associate director of the Office of Management and 
Budget, the Federal Personnel Management Project was divided into nine task forces, one of 
which dealt directly with issues relating to the senior executives in government. Sally Greenberg, 
a senior official at the Civil Service Commission, chaired this task force.  
In its written report, the task force identified the most critical problems as follows: 
1. Neither the Congress nor the President has effective control over the total numbers of the 
executive cadre. 
2. The numbers of executives authorized have little relationship to current needs and the 
system cannot adapt rapidly to program changes. 
3. The multiplicity of hiring authorities with different requirements and provisions results in 
individuals with substantially similar responsibilities being employed and compensated 
under very different standards. It is susceptible to manipulation and fosters the use of 
questionable, albeit legal, maneuvers.  
4. Individuals with little or no adequate managerial expertise can be placed in positions 
responsible for managing billion-dollar federal programs and for supervising thousands of 
employees. 
5. Career employees have little opportunity to undertake positions of the highest 
responsibility without relinquishing their career tenure.  
6. Whenever there is a change in political leadership, there is a period in many agencies 
during which the work of the Government is done at a minimum maintenance level. New 
initiatives are rare and even on-going programs operate in low gear. 
7. There are critically important executive positions classified as “career” which new 
administrations would like to fill with executives of their own choosing, but reassignments of 
incumbents are very difficult to make, principally because of the existing protection of ‘rank’ 
and system inflexibilities.  
8. It is commonly observed by both career and noncareer executives that some career 
managers are functioning in less than an optimum manner, in some instances because they 
                                                 
13 Ibid., pp. 86-92. 
14 Ibid., p. 93. 
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are in positions which make greater demands on them than they are capable of meeting, in 
other cases because they have no incentive to do their best. It is difficult to remove such 
managers.  
9. Compensation of executives has been a serious problem in recent years with most senior 
executives frozen in pay for long periods, while their subordinates’ pay, compensation for 
comparable positions in the private sector, and the cost of living have all risen dramatically. 
10. The present process for establishing and filling an executive position is time-consuming 
and inefficient. 
11. Minorities and women have been virtually excluded from top management ranks.”15 
The task force’s report described each problem in detail. The report concluded that “these 
problems in the staffing and management of senior managerial positions cannot be adequately 
resolved by revisions to the existing system…. Accordingly, we will recommend establishment of 
a new executive personnel system.”16 The task force outlined several alternatives to the current 
system in its report stemming from the conclusions above, many of which ultimately became part 
of the new SES. 
Goals of the SES 
One of the major goals of the SES was to strengthen the link between the civil service and the 
politically appointed heads of agencies. As Alan “Scotty” Campbell, then chairman of the Civil 
Service Commission who had an integral role in establishing the SES, stated, “we could see the 
dysfunctional effects of career/noncareer interface.”17 The SES was intended to create a stronger 
and smoother link between political appointees and career civil servants, both during presidential 
transition periods and for the duration of administrations. As one former career executive 
reported, the pre-SES federal workforce often had poor relations between civil servants and 
political appointees because they had two different objectives: career employees were focused on 
technical programmatic details while political appointees were more focused on using executive 
and political skills to run the agency.18 This focus on different objectives sometimes led to a rift 
between the two groups. The SES was to be the solution, providing a shared resource to civil 
servants and political appointees alike and facilitating better relations between the two.  
In addition to smoothing over the interface between civil servants and political leadership, the 
creation of the SES was intended to ease the transition period for new Presidents and their 
political appointees. Prior to the establishment of the SES, a centralized corps of senior leaders 
providing consistent leadership across administrations and across agencies did not exist. During a 
presidential transition, which could last for several months, the new administration might not 
provide direction for civil servants.19 The SES was intended, in part, to provide stronger senior 
                                                 
15 Personnel Management Project, Volume 2: Appendices to the Final Staff Report, Washington, DC, December 1977. 
Appendix II, p. 1-2. 
16 Ibid., p. 2. 
17 Alan K. “Scotty” Campbell, “The Original Vision of the SES ... Revisited,” 25 Years from The Bureaucrat to The 
Public Manager, vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 27. 
18 James E. Colvard, “Clear Air Turbulence in the Careerist/Political Appointee Zone,” The Public Manager, vol. 24, 
no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 34-36. 
19 Bernard Rosen, “Uncertainty in the Senior Executive Service,” Public Administration Review, vol. 41, no. 2 (Mar-
(continued...) 
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leadership during presidential transitions so as to avoid this lull between administrations. The 
hope was that the SES would provide incoming presidents with a flexible, responsive set of 
managers tasked with ensuring agencies were running smoothly under the newly appointed 
leadership. This could help to ease the uncertainty that often accompanied presidential transitions. 
Creation of the SES 
The timing may have been an important element of President Carter’s reformation of the civil 
service. As one scholar noted, the creation of the SES and its objectives were “logical responses 
to the moral and management failures of Watergate and Great Society program implementation: 
to increase the effectiveness of program performance and to increase public confidence in and 
satisfaction with the integrity and the competence of federal program administration.”20 
Following a period that has been identified by many as one of discontent and distrust in 
government, President Carter made civil service reform one of the primary goals of his 
administration.  
Upon the completion of the Personnel Management Project’s exploration of the current civil 
service system, President Carter sent a message to Congress in March 1978 with a proposal to 
overhaul the civil service system. In the message, he stated that “a critical factor in determining 
whether Federal programs succeed or fail is the ability of the senior managers who run them.”21 
Seven months later, Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act and created a new Senior 
Executive Service, which matched very closely the reforms suggested by the Federal Personnel 
Management Project in December 1977 and then proposed by President Carter. In July 1979, the 
SES was launched when nearly 7,000 government executives joined.22  
Features of the Senior Executive Service 
This section discusses several key elements of the SES, including the types of positions and 
appointments, the role of OPM, how career appointees enter the SES, compensation, and the 
issues of mobility and rank-in-person. 
SES Structure: Types of Positions  
A major objective of the SES was to provide managerial expertise to the political leadership of an 
agency, as well as to the career civil servants within the agency. To limit the politicization of the 
SES, a 10% government-wide limit was placed on the number of political appointments to SES 
positions. Within individual agencies, the limit is 25% of total SES positions in the agency.23 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Apr 1981), pp. 203-207. 
20 Bruce Buchanan, “The Senior Executive Service: How We Can Tell If It Works,” Public Administration Review, vol. 
41, no. 3 (May-June 1981), pp. 349-358. 
21 U.S. President (Carter), “Federal Civil Service Reform: Message to the Congress,” Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978, vol. I (Washington: GPO, 1979), pp. 444-449. 
22 Huddleston and Boyer, Higher Civil Service, 109. 
23 5 U.S.C. § 3134. 
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Comprising primarily career positions, the SES was designed to be largely insulated from 
political influence, but was intended to provide a consistent source of leadership across 
administrations.  
The SES has two types of positions: career reserved and general. Approximately half of SES 
positions are career reserved and half are general.24 Once an SES position is established within an 
agency, it must be designated as either career reserved or general, and it may not be changed 
without OPM approval.25 
Career reserved positions must be filled by career employees. According to OPM, certain types of 
positions must be removed from political influence to ensure public confidence in the impartiality 
of certain government functions.26 Examples include audits, inspections, civil or criminal law 
enforcement, grants administration, and security matters⎯ “the principal duties of which involve 
day-to-day operations, without responsibility for or substantial involvement in the determination 
or public advocacy of the major controversial policies of the Administration or agency.”27 Any 
type of position responsible for these duties is designated as a career reserved position. 
General positions can be filled by career appointees, noncareer appointees, and limited term 
appointees. An agency may convert a position from career reserved to general, or vice versa, but 
must first seek and receive written approval from OPM.28  
SES Structure: Types of Appointments 
Within the two types of SES positions, there are three types of appointments: career, noncareer, 
and limited. Most SES positions, including general positions, are filled through a career 
appointment. Career appointees may fill a wide range of needs within agencies, such as 
administering programs, providing legal counsel, and managing field offices.  
Table 1 presents a breakdown of how many senior executives are currently serving in the 
government by appointment type.  
 
 
                                                 
24 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Government 
Policy and Supporting Positions, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., Committee Print, November 12, 2008 (Washington: GPO, 
2008), p. 200, also referred to as the “Plum Book.”  
25 5 U.S.C. § 3133(e)(2). For more information on the conversion of employees from noncareer positions to career 
positions, see CRS Report RL34706, Federal Personnel: Conversion of Employees from Appointed (Noncareer) 
Positions to Career Positions in the Executive Branch, by Barbara L. Schwemle. 
26 5 U.S.C. § 3132(b)(1). 
27 The list of occupational disciplines designated by OPM to be Career Reserved positions may be found at 5 C.F.R. § 
214.402. 
28 5 C.F.R. § 214.403. 
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Table 1. SES Membership by Appointment Type as of March 2012 
Appointment Type 
Number of Senior 
Executives 
Careera 7,146 
Noncareer 681 
Limited term/limited emergency 122 
Total 7,949 
Source: Congressional Research Service, using data from the Office of Personnel Management’s FedScope 
website, located at http://www.fedscope.opm.gov/employment.asp. 
a. As discussed above in the section entitled “SES Structure: Types of Positions,” about half of the career 
appointees are placed into career reserved positions and the other half into general positions. The 
noncareer and limited term/limited emergency appointees are placed into general positions.  
Career appointments are made through a competitive, merit staffing process. The agency 
publishes a job announcement for an SES position, rates and ranks eligible applicants, and 
approves of the candidate’s qualifications. Both the agency and the SES Qualifications Review 
Board (QRB), administered by OPM, must review and approve the qualifications of the 
candidate. The candidate must be certified by the QRB for the individual to receive an 
appointment to the position.29  
As discussed above, noncareer appointees may serve in only general positions. The process for 
entering the SES for noncareer appointees is different from career appointees. There is no 
requirement for a competitive staffing process for noncareer appointees. Noncareer appointees 
must have their qualifications certified by the head of the hiring agency. 
Noncareer appointees may serve as chiefs of staff or various senior advisers within the Cabinet 
departments. Other examples include the heads of some regional offices of various agencies (such 
as the Environmental Protection Agency and the General Services Administration).  
Limited term appointees may serve only in general positions for a specified period of time. A 
limited term appointment is used in situations where the position is established on a temporary 
basis (up to three years, or up to 18 months for a limited emergency appointment).30 Limited term 
and limited emergency appointments are not renewable.31 Limited term appointees may head a 
specific project or be used to meet an agency’s unanticipated need. For example, following 
Hurricane Katrina, the Department of Homeland Security established positions for some limited 
term appointees, including the Chief Finance Director for Gulf Coast Recovery and a Director of 
the New Orleans Transitional Recovery Office.32 
                                                 
29 5 C.F.R. § 317.502. 
30 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Policy and Supporting Positions, p. 200. 
31  United States Office of Personnel Management, Guide to the Senior Executive Service, Washington, DC, January 
2001, p. 2. 
32 Ibid., p. 82. For information on emergency situations and human resources in the federal government, see CRS 
Report RS22264, Federal Employees: Human Resources Management Flexibilities in Emergency Situations, by 
Barbara L. Schwemle. 
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Government-wide, limited appointments may not exceed 5% of all SES positions.33 Each agency 
is provided with limited appointment authorities from OPM for a total of up to 3% of their SES 
position allocations. Additional positions require OPM approval.34 
SES and the Role of OPM 
The Civil Service Reform Act replaced the Civil Service Commission with the Merit System 
Protection Board (MSPB) and OPM. As President Carter said in his message to Congress on civil 
service reform, the Civil Service Commission was acting as both the “protector of employee 
rights and as the promoter of efficient personnel management policy.”35 The reorganization 
separated these elements, granting OPM responsibility for employee training, examinations, and 
administration of pay and benefits, and granting the MSPB responsibility for protecting employee 
rights. 
With regard to the SES, OPM was tasked with the creating SES positions and distributing them to 
agencies; granting sabbaticals to senior executives and encouraging mobility; establishing a 
qualifications review board to certify qualifications of candidates for SES positions; establishing 
programs for the continual development of SES members or requiring agencies to establish such 
programs; and performing other general administrative functions.36 
Entering the SES: Career Appointments 
Career reserved positions are filled using merit staffing procedures. Job candidates are recruited 
through a published announcement on the government’s USAJOBS website, after which eligible 
candidates are rated and ranked.37 When the agency has selected its preferred candidate, first the 
agency must approve the qualifications of the individual for the position, then OPM must approve 
the qualifications of the individual for the SES. 
Within each agency, an Executive Resources Board (ERB) reviews the qualifications for the top-
ranked individuals who have applied to the position and makes recommendations to the official(s) 
within the agency who is responsible for selecting the candidate.38 The selecting authority makes 
a choice and certifies that the candidate meets the technical qualifications for the position. 
Following the agency’s certification of the individual, the agency submits the application package 
to OPM.  
OPM then convenes an SES Qualifications Review Board (QRB) to review the candidate’s 
executive core qualifications (ECQs), which were devised by OPM.39 ECQs are the general skills 
OPM deems necessary for senior executives. The five ECQs are (1) Leading Change, (2) Leading 
                                                 
33 This limit does not count toward the 10% limit on noncareer appointments. 5 U.S.C. § 3134(e). 
34 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Policy and Supporting Positions, p. 201. 
35 U.S. President (Carter), “Federal Civil Service Reform: Message to the Congress,” Public Papers of the Presidents of 
the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978, vol. I (Washington: GPO, 1979), pp. 444-449. 
36 5 U.S.C. § 3131 et seq. 
37 Job postings must be listed for at least 14 days (5 C.F.R. § 317.501(b)(2)). 
38 5 C.F.R. § 317.501(a). 
39 The Qualifications Review Board consists of current senior executives. 
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People, (3) Results Driven, (4) Business Acumen, and (5) Building Coalitions.40 The QRB 
certifies candidates, provided they can demonstrate all of these qualifications, before they can be 
selected to join the SES. Following QRB certification, the agency may appoint the individual to 
the SES position.  
One option for those interested in joining the SES is to participate in a Candidate Development 
Program (CDP).41 A CDP provides training to individuals who are interested in obtaining an SES 
appointment. Entrance into the program is competitive, so individuals must go through an 
application process. Individuals participating in a CDP receive training based upon the Executive 
Core Qualifications. Individuals who complete the program may apply for certification by a 
QRB, and graduates of the CDP are eligible for appointment to the SES without further 
competition. However, graduation from the program does not guarantee appointment to a position 
in the SES.42 
Career appointees serve a one-year probationary period, during which the individual’s supervisor 
can take action to remove the individual from the SES “if it becomes apparent, after full and fair 
consideration, that the executive’s performance is not suitable for satisfactory work.”43 After 
completion of the probationary period, an SES career appointee may be removed from the SES 
for cause or poor performance.44 Generally, a career senior executive who held a civil service 
position at the time of appointment to the SES and is removed from the SES may be placed into a 
civil service position.45  
Mobility and Rank-In-Person 
The CSRA provides that “The Office [of Personnel Management] shall encourage and assist 
individuals to improve their skills and increase their contribution by service in a variety of 
agencies as well as by accepting temporary placements in State or local governments or in the 
private sector.”46 The SES was envisioned to be a highly mobile corps of individuals who would 
apply the skills obtained by serving in a wide variety of agencies and positions to challenges in 
government. Mobility would offer an expanded set of learning opportunities. The original concept 
did not envision SES members as technical experts, but leaders who had executive management 
experience. By exposing individuals to positions in various agencies, the hope was that SES 
members could bring fresh perspective to a range of needs in the government.47 
                                                 
40 OPM’s Guide to Senior Executive Service Qualifications is accessible at http://www.opm.gov/ses/references/
GuidetoSESQuals_2010.pdf. 
41 OPM’s website for the SES Federal Candidate Development Program may be found at http://www.opm.gov/fedcdp/. 
42 Information about OPM’s Federal Candidate Development Program may be found at OPM’s website: 
http://www.opm.gov/fedcdp/FFALbrochurefinal.pdf. 
43 The SES probation policy is located on OPM’s website, at http://www.opm.gov/ses/performance/probation.asp. 
44 5 C.F.R. § 359.402 et seq. 
45 For information about placement rights for senior executives that have been removed from the SES, see 5 C.F.R. § 
359.702. Career appointees who entered the SES from a civil service position generally may “be placed in a position of 
tenure equivalent to that of the appointment held at the time of appointment to the SES.” Further information can be 
found on OPM’s website at http://www.opm.gov/ses/performance/removal.asp. 
46 5 U.S.C. § 3396(d)(1). 
47 Huddleston and Boyer, Higher Civil Service, pp. 116-119. 
The Senior Executive Service: Background and Options for Reform 
 
Congressional Research Service 10 
Rather than creating positions that carried a certain rank and grade level, as are provided in GS 
and similar pay scales, the new system called for attaching rank to individuals. The idea of 
attaching a rank to a person was intended to allow for greater flexibility in reassigning that 
individual to a different position or agency.48 
SES Pay 
There have been several changes to the pay structure of the SES. The Civil Service Reform Act 
created an incentive-based pay system for the SES that rewarded good performance with higher 
pay and monetary awards. In 2004, however, the pay system for senior executives was changed 
dramatically.49 There were two driving factors behind this change. The first was pay compression, 
and the second was the President’s Management Agenda, which was instituted by the George W. 
Bush Administration.  
The original SES pay system had six levels of basic pay, ES-1 through ES-6. The lowest rate was 
tied to the rate of the top level of the General Schedule (GS) scale, and the highest rate of pay was 
tied to the Executive Schedule (EX) scale. In other words, SES basic pay would fall between 
“120 percent of the minimum rate of basic pay for GS-15” and it could not exceed EX Level IV.50 
Senior executives also received locality pay when appropriate. The combination of basic pay and 
locality pay, however, could not exceed the level of EX-III.51 Increases in pay would be 
determined by the President concurrent with annual adjustments to the GS pay scale. In addition, 
up to 50% of senior executives could be eligible for annual cash performance bonuses. The 
bonuses would be linked with the individuals’ annual performance reviews, and they could be 
worth up to 20% of an employee’s basic pay.52 
Under the original pay system, however, salary compression became an increasing problem. 
Because the floor of the SES pay scale continued to climb gradually as GS-15 pay levels 
increased, SES pay increased over time. However, the top of the pay scale did not increase at the 
same rate as at the bottom of the scale. The result of increases in the minimum pay and the 
statutorily imposed caps was pay compression within the ranks of the SES. The differences 
between what SES members made at each pay level continually decreased, and in many cases, the 
top several pay levels actually received the same salary.53 Some possible results of pay 
compression may have included difficulties recruiting and retaining talented senior executives.54  
                                                 
48 CRS Report RL33128, Senior Executive Service (SES) Pay for Performance System, by L. Elaine Halchin, p. 1. 
49 For a more detailed analysis of the pay for performance system instituted in 2004, see CRS Report RL33128, Senior 
Executive Service (SES) Pay for Performance System, by L. Elaine Halchin. 
50 EX Level IV is associated with positions such as Assistant Cabinet Secretaries, several General Counsels of Cabinet 
departments, and the members of certain regulatory boards such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
National Labor Relations Board. The positions that receive EX-IV pay are listed at 5 U.S.C. § 5315. 
51 EX Level III is associated with positions such as Cabinet department Under Secretaries, the chairs of several 
regulatory boards such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Communications Commission, and 
Administrators of such organizations as the Small Business Administration and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services. The complete list of positions that receive EX-III pay can be found at 5 U.S.C. § 5314. 
52 Sec. 407, P.L. 95-454. 
53 CRS Report RL33128, Senior Executive Service (SES) Pay for Performance System, by L. Elaine Halchin, p. 2-4. 
54 Ibid., p. 7. 
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President George W. Bush introduced the President’s Management Agenda in 2001 (PMA). The 
PMA revisited the managerial capabilities of the federal workforce, including the SES, with the 
aim of making government performance more results oriented. One concern for the PMA was that 
SES members were consistently rated at the highest level on their performance appraisals. On 
more than one occasion, the OPM Director reminded agency officials that these appraisals should 
be based on measurable results.55  
The first major changes to the pay system occurred in 2002, when the Homeland Security Act56 
increased the cap on total compensation for senior executives in agencies that have OPM-certified 
appraisal systems to the Vice President’s salary (currently $230,700 in 2012). For agencies 
without a certified system, the cap on pay remained EX-I (currently $199,700 in 2012).57  
In his FY2004 budget request, President Bush proposed further changes to the pay structure. He 
proposed providing more financial incentives for senior executives by increasing the pay ceiling 
and eliminating the six-level pay structure, and encouraging agencies to determine pay for senior 
executives based upon their individual performance. In accordance with the President’s budget 
request message on SES pay, Congress passed provisions in the FY2004 National Defense 
Authorization Act that modified the SES pay system. These changes included (1) eliminating 
locality pay from the SES; (2) replacing the six pay levels with a single pay range; (3) increasing 
the cap on basic pay from EX-IV to EX-III; and (4) adding a higher cap on basic pay, EX-II,58 for 
agencies that have OPM-certified performance appraisals.59  
A central element of the pay-for-performance system encourages agencies to have an OPM-
certified performance appraisal system.60 Under a certified appraisal system, the cap on basic pay 
is currently $179,700. Otherwise, the cap is $165,300. The purpose of this was to create stronger 
performance incentives. Many critics viewed the previous performance appraisal system for the 
SES as flawed, since most members of the SES received the highest possible rating. The new 
system encourages agencies to have meaningful distinctions among their performance ratings.  
Table 2 presents the current basic pay levels for SES, based upon these statutory requirements, 
which are within the following ranges: 
                                                 
55 Ibid., pp. 7-10. 
56 Sec. 1322, P.L. 107-296. 
57 EX Level I is associated with the heads of executive branch agencies such as Cabinet departments, the Social 
Security Administration, and the Federal Reserve System. The complete list of positions that receive EX-I pay can be 
found at 5 U.S.C. § 5312. 
58 EX Level II pay is usually associated with positions such as Deputy Secretaries and Administrators of programs such 
as the Federal Aviation Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. The complete list of positions that receive EX-II pay can be found at 5 U.S.C. § 5313. 
59 CRS Report RL33128, Senior Executive Service (SES) Pay for Performance System, by L. Elaine Halchin. 
60 Some elements of the certification of agencies’ performance appraisal system include the following: alignment of 
individual performance expectations with broader agency goals; consultation with senior employees; use of measurable 
results in evaluation of senior executives; and demonstration that distribution in pay among SES members reflects 
meaningful distinctions between performance levels. A memorandum from John Berry, OMB Director, to the heads of 
agencies and executive departments providing guidance on the appraisal certification is available at OPM’s website at 
http://www.chcoc.gov/Transmittals/TransmittalDetails.aspx?TransmittalId=2854. 
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Table 2. 2012 Rates of Pay for the Senior Executive Service 
 Minimum Basic Pay Maximum Basic Pay Maximum Total Paya  
Agencies without OPM-
certified appraisal system 
$119,554 $165,300 $199,700 
Agencies with OPM-certified 
appraisal system 
$119,554 $179,700 $230,700 
Source: Congressional Research Service, using data from the Office of Personnel Management’s website, 
located at http://www.opm.gov/ses/performance/salary.asp. 
a. The maximum total pay allowed to senior executives includes basic pay, bonuses, and awards.  
The elimination of locality pay for senior executives was intended to foster greater performance 
incentives. Senior executives no longer receive an automatic increase in their basic pay based 
upon their geographic location; rather, they are encouraged to augment their pay through good 
performance. To provide these fiscal incentives, several types of pay increases and awards are 
available to senior executives. Automatic pay increases do not occur, but pay adjustments can 
occur on an annual basis to reward good performance or to maintain an individual’s relative 
position within the SES pay range.61 Career executives with good performance ratings may be 
eligible for performance awards (one-time bonuses) that can range from 5% to 20% of their basic 
pay. All SES members, regardless of type of appointment, may be eligible for incentive awards 
for a suggestion, invention, or special act of service that improves the functioning of the federal 
government.  
Additionally, a small group of career senior executives is awarded a Presidential Rank Award 
each year.62 Presidential Rank Awards have two categories: Distinguished Rank, which awards 
recipients 35% of their annual basic pay, and Meritorious Rank, which awards recipients 20% of 
their annual basic pay. Up to 1% of senior executives can be Distinguished Rank recipients in a 
given year, and up to 5% can be Meritorious Rank recipients per year.  
Options for Reform 
While many of the goals of the original vision for the SES have been achieved, critics maintain 
that unintended consequences have occurred in its development and that the SES can be further 
improved. Advocates for SES reform argue that changes could improve the efficiency and the 
management of government programs and the government workforce. 
For example, a report by the Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton published in 
August 2009 examined the current condition of the SES, stating, 
Our primary finding is that the Senior Executive Service as envisioned by reformers has 
fallen short of its promise. The original vision of the SES was never realized. More 
importantly, we find that the original vision itself is inadequate for today’s needs and does 
not provide the blueprint to build the kind of senior government leadership required for the 
                                                 
61 5 C.F.R. § 534.404. 
62 The presidential awards were also a component of the original SES pay system in the CSRA. Information about 
performance awards for senior executives can be found at OPM’s website, available at http://www.opm.gov/ses/
performance/awards.asp. 
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future…. Building a consistently high-caliber, government-wide executive organization is 
impeded by decentralized talent development and recruitment processes, passive recruiting, 
an exceedingly cumbersome and lengthy hiring system, inadequate leadership training 
programs and a pay structure than can allow subordinates to earn more than top-level 
executives.63 
The Senior Executive Service’s professional association, the Senior Executive Association (SEA), 
has also suggested a need for reforms to the SES. Carol Bonosaro, president of the SEA, has been 
a strong advocate for reforms. In testimony she gave before the House Committee on Homeland 
Security’s Subcommittee on Management, Investigation and Oversight in March 2009, she 
proposed several reforms for the Department of Homeland Security and government-wide. She 
suggested a number of changes that would help to do the following: 
Restore career leadership, create a more fair and transparent pay and performance 
management system, and provide for training and continuing development of the SES. 
Making such reforms to the SES system across the government will help all agencies, 
including DHS, recruit and retain the best Senior Executives and ensure that they have the 
necessary tools to effectively carry out the missions of their agencies.64  
This section discusses some areas that advocates for changes to the SES have identified as 
needing reform, including pay compression, recruiting and retaining of senior executives, career 
development and training opportunities, mobility, diversity, and the role of OPM. 
Pay Compression 
As discussed above, Congress enacted a series of reforms to the SES’s pay structure in 2004. 
Among other changes, the 2004 reforms to SES pay eliminated locality pay in an attempt to 
provide stronger performance incentives to SES members. However, the changes created a 
system in which GS-14s and GS-15s, historically considered to be prime candidates for SES 
positions, may have little or no monetary incentive to move to the SES. As discussed above, the 
current basic pay for members of the SES starts at 120% of the GS-15 step 1 pay (currently 
$119,554). However, individuals at a GS-15 step 1 in the Washington, D.C. area currently earn 
$123,758, including locality pay.65 Individuals who are at a GS-14 step 6 or higher also earn more 
than the minimum basic pay for SES members (a GS-14 step 6 base plus locality pay for 
Washington, D.C. is $122,744). This could mean that senior executives in agencies may have 
employees serving under them who earn more money than the executives.  
Carol Bonosaro, president of the Senior Executives Association, raised the point in testimony 
before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Management, 
Investigations, and Oversight in 2009 that most senior workers in the federal government are not 
primarily motivated by pay, and therefore some might argue that this pay overlap should not 
                                                 
63 Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton, Unrealized Vision: Reimagining the Senior Executive 
Service, August 2009, pp. i-ii, http://www.ourpublicservice.org/OPS/publications/viewcontentdetails.php?id=136. 
64 Testimony of Carol Bonosaro, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Management, Investigations, and Oversight, Putting People First: A Way Forward for the Department of Homeland 
Security Workforce, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 5, 2009. p. 2, available at http://www.seniorexecs.org/fileadmin/
user_upload/Testimony/DHS.pdf. 
65 According to OPM’s website, 75% of senior executives are in the Washington, D.C. area. Office of Personnel 
Management, “Facts and Figures,” at http://www.opm.gov/ses/facts_and_figures/demographics.asp. 
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matter. However, as she states, along with the possibility of lower pay and lower retirement 
benefits, SES positions also have “added responsibilities, added risk, and less time with families.” 
Another possible disincentive for individuals to join the SES is that the SES performance bonuses 
do not count toward senior executives’ retirement annuities. If performance awards could count 
toward an executive’s “high-three,”66 she argued, the SES would become a more attractive career 
goal for federal workers.67 
Another problem that senior executives have identified with the current pay system is a perceived 
disconnect between performance ratings and pay adjustments. According to a 2006 Senior 
Executives Association survey, many senior executives believed that changes in pay were based 
primarily on administrative decisions and budgetary constraints, not on their actual performance. 
In that same survey, 233 executives reported increased responsibilities since the new pay system 
was instituted in 2004, but 82% of those 233 executives received no salary increase to match their 
increased workload.68  
Critics have also suggested that SES pay is low compared to equivalent jobs in the private sector. 
The opportunity cost for members of the SES can be high if they have an opportunity to work in a 
senior management position in the private sector. Luring highly qualified candidates to serve in 
the public sector when they could be making a much higher salary in the private sector can be 
challenging, according to this view. In addition, the fact that the SES does not receive locality pay 
may also be a hindrance when it comes to attracting people to SES positions. This may be 
especially true for individuals who do not live in Washington, D.C. already, since according to 
OPM’s website, 75% of SES jobs are located in the Washington D.C. area, while most GS jobs 
are located outside of Washington, D.C.69 
Recruiting and Retaining SES Members 
For an effective SES, recruiting and retaining highly qualified individuals is essential. The SES 
has had difficulty with both of these issues over the course of its history.  
Recruiting 
Some outside observers have noted that the recruiting process for the SES has not reached its 
potential. A recent report on the Senior Executive Service, for example, found that the 
government tends to be passive in its recruiting of senior executives. Agencies tend to fill their 
SES positions from within their own civil service ranks, often without considering a broader pool 
of applicants from across the government, or outside the government. Some say that agencies 
could benefit from actively developing and preparing their own GS-14s and GS-15s for SES 
                                                 
66 The “high-three” refers to the system of calculating government workers’ annuities. The high-three bases a retiree’s 
annuity payment on the average of the highest-paying three consecutive years in the employee’s government service.  
67 Testimony of Carol A. Bonosaro, President of the Senior Executives Association, in U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight, Putting People First: 
A Way Forward for the Department of Homeland Security Workforce, 111th Cong., March 5, 2009. 
68 Ibid. The survey can be found at OPM’s website, at http://www.opm.gov/ses/SES_survey_results_complete.pdf. 
69 OPM’s SES Member Profile, including geographic location, is located at http://www.opm.gov/ses/facts_and_figures/
demographics.asp. For detailed information on the location of government employees, see the latest employment cube 
of OPM’s FedScope database, which houses data on federal employees. FedScope is located at OPM’s website: 
http://www.fedscope.opm.gov/employment.asp. 
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positions so that when they choose to hire from within, the individuals would be more prepared 
for the SES. 70  
Advocates for SES reform have argued that one way in which agencies could improve SES 
recruiting efforts would be to pay more attention to the talent pipeline within the government. By 
developing the skills of individuals who are likely to serve as future senior executives, agencies 
would be able to identify qualified individuals who they would like to bring on as senior 
executives. Federal agencies may have a Candidate Development Program (CDP; see section 
entitled “Entering the SES: Career Appointments” above). However, as some have pointed out, 
these programs have not developed as originally intended. As one scholar and former federal 
executive pointed out, a significant number of participants in the early years of the Federal CDP 
program were not selected for the SES. Technical experts were regularly selected over those who 
had undergone the CDP training, which reinforced a cultural bias within agencies toward 
individuals with specialized and technical expertise.71  
This bias toward technical expertise rather than leadership ability was also reinforced by the fact 
that when established, the SES consisted of “supergrade” individuals who already were 
specialists and did not necessarily have the leadership training and skills that the government 
requires for SES members. This was a result of the conversion of top-level GS positions into SES 
positions in 1979. As one scholar noted, “the US civil service suddenly had several thousand 
senior executives who were specialists one day and, by definition, generalist executives the 
next.”72 Due in part to the way in which the supergrade positions were converted into SES 
positions, the tendency toward specialists as executives has remained.  
A related critique of the current hiring process is that agencies tend to focus on an applicant’s 
technical skills, rather than leadership and management skills. Selecting a technical expert for an 
SES position may not fulfill the original vision of the SES. Although technical experts can 
provide specific knowledge of government programs, they may not have the vision or executive 
skills to “move a program forward strategically,” according to one report.73 Hiring technical 
experts over generalists with leadership skills might occur for several reasons: identifying 
technical skills is easier than identifying skills such as leadership capabilities; technical experts 
may serve agencies better in the short term; and failure to consider leadership capability during 
the hiring process.74  
Retaining Senior Executives 
Retention of talented government employees is essential for the smooth operation of the public 
sector, and this is especially true for the SES. Attrition of senior executives can cause several 
problems, including the loss of knowledge and/or skills; a deterioration in organizational loyalty 
among employees; and a vacancy in the agency that may take some time to fill.75 The SES has 
                                                 
70 Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton, Unrealized Vision, pp. 7-8. 
71 James E. Colvard, “Senior Executive Service Had High Hopes,” 25 Years from The Bureaucrat to The Public 
Manager, vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 21. 
72 Ibid., p. 21. 
73 Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton, Unrealized Vision, p. 15. 
74 Ibid., pp. 14-16. 
75 For information on and strategies for retention of federal employees, see the Partnership for Public Service and Booz 
Allen Hamilton, Keeping Talent: Strategies for Retaining Valued Federal Employees, January 2011, at 
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had some difficulty retaining talented individuals. In the first decade of its existence, it had a 
turnover rate of almost 10% annually. By March of 1983, over 40% of the senior executives who 
had converted in July 1979 left government service.76 Similar trends continued for the next three 
decades.  
Although some sources have cited low pay as a reason that certain individuals may leave the SES, 
a recent study showed that few senior executives thought pay was a reason the government faced 
problems with retention of senior executives.77 Respondents noted that individuals who make a 
commitment to public service know what kind of salary they will be receiving. Those who would 
be likely to leave the SES because they are not getting the pay they want are unlikely to join in 
the first place. According to this argument, the bigger challenge with pay is for recruiting rather 
than retention.  
According to several sources, “onboard” training for new senior executives is lacking, which 
might play a role in retention efforts.78 Ideally, successful onboard training would expedite the 
transition period for new senior executives, especially for those coming from outside government. 
A 2008 Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton report about onboarding argued 
that the private sector has shown that successful onboarding is crucial to improving retention, 
performance, engagement of employees, and shortens the length of time it takes for a new 
employee to become productive. The report suggested that the government could benefit from 
improving its onboarding programs, including those programs for executives.79 
A successful onboarding program could also emphasize, for those individuals who are moving to 
an SES position from a GS-14 or GS-15, those skills which differentiate senior executives from 
the rest of the civil service. Such a program could encourage early development of the leadership 
skills in the potential senior executives that many critics have said are lacking.  
Another area that critics have identified as needing improvement is career development and 
training, discussed more in the section below. Having greater development opportunities for 
senior executives could also help retention efforts. 
Career Development and Training 
The Civil Service Reform Act gave responsibility for the training of senior executives to OPM. 
OPM may delegate responsibility for training to agencies, but OPM is still responsible for 
establishing criteria, assisting with the implementation, and overseeing and enforcing adherence 
to the agency’s criteria.80  
                                                                 
(...continued) 
http://www.ourpublicservice.org/OPS/publications/viewcontentdetails.php?id=154 
76 Huddleston and Boyer, Higher Civil Service in the United States, p. 112. 
77 Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton, Unrealized Vision, p. 11. 
78 Bonosaro, Putting People First, p. 8; Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton, Unrealized Vision, p. 
16. 
79 Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton, Getting On Board: A Model for Integrating and Engaging 
New Employees, May 2008, available at http://www.ourpublicservice.org/OPS/publications/viewcontentdetails.php?id=
128. 
80  5 U.S.C. § 3396. 
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OPM offers a number of training opportunities for senior executives, including the Federal 
Executive Institute and three Management Development Centers that provide leadership training 
for government executives. OPM’s training opportunities attempt to strengthen and reinforce the 
Executive Core Qualifications (ECQs) that are required of all senior executives. In addition, OPM 
encourages agencies to establish training programs of their own and provides guidance on its 
website for agencies to do so.81 In March 2011, a representative from OPM testified before the 
Senate’s Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee that OPM is working with the 
Federal Executive Institute to develop additional opportunities such as more frequent SES 
orientation programs and networking opportunities.82  
Although there are some training opportunities for senior executives through OPM, some critics 
say that OPM has largely delegated the responsibility to agencies, and that neither agencies nor 
OPM have prioritized training. As a result, senior executives are mostly responsible for finding 
their own training opportunities, and many feel that their professional development is not a 
priority in their agencies.83 This decentralized approach has led to variation in training 
opportunities among agencies. Providing training programs can be especially difficult for small 
agencies that may have small budgets.84  
A critique of the decentralized training structure is that it violates the spirit of the original SES 
vision. Government-wide training programs, in which executives could share experiences and 
learn from their colleagues in other agencies, have been inconsistent and infrequent since the SES 
was launched. Such training and development sessions would have been more aligned with the 
original intent of civil service reform, some critics have pointed out.85 Training opportunities tend 
to be agency-specific, reinforcing the SES’s current agency-centric structure.  
One study of the SES suggested that the government could take advantage of its own resources to 
provide additional training opportunities for SES members. For example, Presidential Rank 
Award recipients could be a training resource for development of potential or current senior 
executives.86  
Responses to a 2008 OPM survey of senior executives showed that many senior executives feel 
their own developmental opportunities could improve. Fifty-five percent of executives were 
satisfied with the developmental opportunities available to them. Over a third of the survey 
respondents (35%) felt that their developmental needs were not assessed. Only about 25% of 
agency executives said they had received some sort of formal executive coaching.87 These 
                                                 
81 Information about the training offered for senior executives by OPM, as well as guidance for agencies on 
establishing and maintaining development programs, can be found on OPM’s website, available at 
http://www.opm.gov/ses/executive_development/index.asp. 
82 Testimony of Nancy Kichak, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 
Strengthening the Senior Executive Service: A Review of Challenges Facing the Government’s Leadership Corps, 112th 
Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 2011, pp. 3-4. 
83 Bonosaro, Putting People First, pp. 3-4. 
84 U.S. General Accounting Office, Senior Executive Service: Training and Development of Senior Executives, 
GAO/GGD-89-127, September 1989, pp. 4-5, at http://archive.gao.gov/d26t7/139989.pdf. 
85 U.S. General Accounting Office, Senior Executive Service: Training and Development of Senior Executives, and 
Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton, Unrealized Vision, p. 17. 
86 Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton, Unrealized Vision, p. 18. 
87 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Senior Executive Service Survey Results, Washington, D.C., May 2008, at 
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responses reinforce the suggestion of some that development of executives may not be a high 
priority for many agencies.  
Mobility of SES Members 
The SES was intended to be a government-wide, cohesive corps of individuals that encouraged 
mobility within and across government agencies. The thought was that SES members would gain 
experience and leadership skills from being mobile that they could apply across different 
government agencies and positions. Mobility would bring fresh perspective to agencies and 
would encourage the individuals to apply a broader skill set to an agency’s needs, rather than 
allowing individuals to get too involved in technical details of agency programs. Moreover, senior 
executives would form cross-agency relationships that would enrich their skills that they could 
apply to their own position.  
Mobility of senior executives, however, has never been fully realized. Few senior executives have 
worked outside their own agency. Various sources have cited several reasons for why senior 
executives are not mobile. Since the creation of the SES, job rotations seem to be widely 
perceived as punitive and a way for political leaders to get rid of unwanted personnel, rather than 
a tool for improving one’s skill set.88  
Other barriers to mobility that have been cited include the way that OPM has delegated a great 
deal of responsibility over senior executives to individual agencies.89 The CSRA required OPM to 
serve as a centralized administrator for the new SES, and it was tasked with many responsibilities 
that it has largely delegated to agencies. Recruitment and assessment have largely been delegated 
to agencies, so OPM has more of a distant oversight role than a direct hand in managing the SES. 
However, to institute a successful job rotation system, a strong, centralized personnel structure 
must exist, some have argued.90 
One scholar suggested that senior executives may be able to learn from the military model with 
regard to frequent job rotations.91 Through job rotations, senior leaders in the military are 
expected to yield a “rich array of career development experiences.”92 Job rotations have the 
potential to broaden understanding about what might make government more effective, because 
individuals would be exposed to and could learn from many different situations and contexts. 
Skills that could be obtained include adaptability, flexibility, leadership, planning, and a broader 
perspective on business functions. 
A recent report on the SES recommended that OPM, in collaboration with each agency, should 
review all existing SES positions and identify those that would truly benefit from a rotational 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
http://www.opm.gov/ses/SES_survey_results_complete.pdf. 
88 Patricia Wallace Ingraham, The Foundation of Merit: Public Service in American Democracy (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 85. 
89 Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton, Unrealized Vision, p. 3 
90 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
91 Al Robbert, “Developing Leadership: Emulating the Military Model,” in High-Performance Government: Structure, 
Leadership, Incentives, ed. Robert Klitgaard and Paul C. Light (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2005), pp. 255-
279. 
92 Ibid., p. 268. 
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component. Given existing challenges and the current government structure, they suggest that the 
idea of an entire SES corps that is mobile is no longer practical. There may be some SES 
positions within agencies that benefit from technical expertise, and agencies may prefer to keep 
those technical experts where they are. The report suggests separating those positions into 
“Agency SES” and “National SES,” while turning some SES positions into Senior Technical (ST) 
and Senior Level (SL) positions where appropriate.93 Members of the National Corps could 
establish mobility agreements with their agencies and institute developmental rotations 
administered by OPM. Those individuals designated as agency senior executives would not have 
the same rotational requirements.  
A similar point was raised at a March 2009 hearing on the SES by Nancy Kichak, a hearing 
witness and Associate Director at OPM. She stated that some SES positions, such as Chief 
Information Officers and Chief Financial Officers, require technical agency expertise, and having 
mobile senior executives rotating in and out of those types of positions may not be appropriate.94  
Diversity 
One issue that has been raised by critics is that the SES lacks diversity. The findings and 
statement of purpose of the Civil Service Reform Act asserted that the law would “provide the 
people of the United States with a competent, honest, and productive Federal work force 
reflective of the Nation’s diversity.”95 However, the SES does not currently reflect the diversity of 
the United States, nor has it reached the level of diversity of the rest of the federal workforce. The 
current demographic profile of these three groups is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Senior Executive Service Demographic Profile 
 
Career Senior 
Executives Federal Workforce 
United States 
Population 
Women 31.8% 43.9% 50.8% 
Men 68.2% 56.1% 49.2% 
American Indian/Alaska 
Native 
1.2% 1.8% 1.2% 
Asian/Pacific Islander 3.0% 5.8% 5.2% 
African-American/Black 9.8% 17.5% 13.1% 
                                                 
93 Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton, Unrealized Vision, p. 20. Senior Technical (ST) and Senior 
Level (SL) positions are positions that are classified above GS-15 but serve slightly different functions than SES. As 
described by OPM on its website, SES positions are those that “involves one or more of the criteria set forth in 5 USC 
3132 (e.g., directing the work of an organization, monitoring progress toward organizational goals, etc.)” ST positions 
are those that “involve high-level research and development. ST positions are established under 5 USC 3104 and are 
always in the competitive service.” SL positions are those for which “the work of the position does not meet the SES 
criteria nor does it involve the fundamental research and development responsibilities that are characteristic of ST 
positions.” Office of Personnel Management, “About the Senior Executive Service: Frequently Asked Questions,” 
available at http://www.opm.gov/ses/about_ses/faqs.asp. 
94 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Strengthening the Senior Executive 
Service: A Review of Challenges Facing the Government’s Leadership Corps, 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 29, 2011. 
95 Sec. 3, P.L. 95-454. 
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Career Senior 
Executives Federal Workforce 
United States 
Population 
Hispanic/Latino 3.3% 6.0% 16.7% 
Source: Congressional Research Service. SES and Federal Workforce data are current as of March 2012 and are 
available at the Office of Personnel Management’s Fedscope database in the Diversity Cube: 
http://www.fedscope.opm.gov/index.asp. Data for the United States population, current as of June 2012, are from 
the U.S. Census Bureau’s “Quick Facts” website: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html. 
In a 2008 report on diversity in the SES, GAO stated that “having a diverse SES corps, which 
generally represents the most experienced segment of the federal workforce, can be an 
organizational strength that can bring a wider variety of perspectives and approaches to bear on 
policy development and implementation, strategic planning, problem solving, and decision 
making.” GAO showed that the diversity in the SES is similar to the diversity of GS-14s and GS-
15s, which comprise what is often viewed as the SES development pool.96 The SES could benefit 
from an increase in diversity in the talent pool since a large number of senior executives are likely 
to retire in the next few years. According to GAO, this would improve the overall quality of the 
SES since “racial, ethnic and gender diversity in the SES is an important component for the 
effective operation of the government.”97 
Some scholars of public bureaucracy have argued that having a diverse government workforce 
can increase the effectiveness of government, because individuals with diverse backgrounds 
might bring a different set of experiences and perspectives to their decisions in government.98 
One scholar stated that an increasingly diverse public workforce can “improve the way in which 
government operates and is perceived by the general citizenry.”99 
OPM’s Management of the SES 
Some scholars of public administration have suggested that a strong OPM is important to 
establishing and maintaining a successful SES. Two years after the initial implementation of the 
SES, Bernard Rosen, then a professor at American University and former executive director of 
the Civil Service Commission, wrote an article entitled “Uncertainty in the Senior Executive 
Service.” Rosen had been a career executive under five different administrations. He argued that 
OPM had a very important role to play in the SES, particularly in President Ronald Reagan’s 
Administration, since it was the first new administration since the SES was instituted. He argued 
that the OPM director must serve as a “catalyst” between the President, his appointees, and the 
agencies. As established by the Civil Service Reform Act, OPM should be able to “provide better 
guidance and monitoring without reverting to the tight controls exercised by the former Civil 
Service Commission. OPM can move from a very limited leadership role to a more active middle 
                                                 
96 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Diversity in the Federal SES and Senior Levels of the U.S. Postal Service 
and Processes for Selecting New Executives, GAO-08-609T, April 3, 2008, p. 2, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d08609t.pdf. 
97 Ibid., p. 10. 
98 See, for example, Jay M. Shafritz et al., Personnel Management in Government: Politics and Processes (New York: 
Marcel Dekker, 1992). 
99 Norma M. Riccucci, Managing Diversity in Public Sector Workforces (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), p.153. 
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ground, and do so in healthy cooperation with the agencies… it would enhance the possibility for 
realizing the high promise of the SES—significant improvement in government operations.”100 
Almost three decades later, the Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton issued a 
study arguing that the lack of OPM efforts to establish a mobile SES has resulted in a highly 
immobile SES.101 The Civil Service Reform Act created OPM and gave it many responsibilities, 
including the authority to grant sabbaticals to senior executives and encourage mobility; establish 
a qualifications review board to certify qualifications of candidates for SES positions; establish 
programs for the continual development of SES members or require agencies to establish such 
programs; and perform other general administrative functions. OPM has delegated a number of 
these responsibilities to agencies, including training and career development, performance 
evaluation, and recruiting efforts. Having a more centralized effort for many of these issues could 
increase the overall strength and effectiveness of the SES. However, some also may suggest that 
giving more control over senior executives to agencies allows agencies more flexibility in their 
own operations.  
Recent Initiatives 
President Obama’s President’s Management Council established a working group to identify, 
among other things, areas for improvement of the SES. OMB and OPM, the agencies that are 
coordinating the working group’s effort, issued a joint memorandum on February 18, 2011, to 
members of the SES. In the memo, leaders from OMB and OPM listed proposals to (1) improve 
SES professional development programs; (2) streamline burdensome administrative processes; 
(3) strengthen personnel performance management; and (4) expand and diversify executive talent 
pipelines. The memo suggested such reforms as encouraging more engagement between senior 
executives and political appointees in agencies and improving the current recruitment techniques 
to increase diversity and talent within the SES.102  
112th Congress 
On March 29, 2011, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs’ 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District 
of Columbia held a hearing on the SES. Entitled “Strengthening the Senior Executive Service: A 
Review of Challenges Facing the Government’s Leadership Corps,” the hearing featured three 
witnesses who discussed many of the issues mentioned in this report. The witnesses were 
representatives from OPM, the Partnership for Public Service, and the Senior Executives 
Association. The chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Daniel Akaka, suggested that 
improvements to the hiring process, among other changes, could help strengthen the SES. Senator 
Ron Johnson, the committee’s ranking member, stressed the importance of strong leadership in 
ensuring effectiveness of an organization, whether it is in the public or private sector. Hearing 
witness Max Stier, president and chief executive of the Partnership for Public Service, suggested 
                                                 
100 Rosen, “Uncertainty in the Senior Executive Service,” p. 207. 
101 Partnership for Public Service and Booz Allen Hamilton, Unrealized Vision, pp. 20-21. 
102 Memorandum from Jeffrey D. Zients, Federal Chief Performance Officer and Deputy Directory for Management, 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and John Berry, Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to 
the Senior Executive Service, February 18, 2011, p. 1. 
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changing the 10% government-wide cap on noncareer senior executives to a 10% cap on each 
individual agency, since the percentage of noncareer appointees varies widely among agencies, 
ranging up to 20% at the Department of Education. Nancy Kichak, a hearing witness from OPM, 
discussed current efforts at OPM to improve the hiring and recruiting processes. Carol Bonosaro, 
the president of the Senior Executives Association, raised the issue of pay compression and 
pressed for changes to the pay system. Other topics that were discussed at the hearing included 
diversity and career development opportunities for senior executives.103  
Later in the 112th Congress, two bills were introduced that would make significant and sweeping 
changes to the SES. The Senior Executive Service Reform Act, S. 2249, was introduced by 
Senator Daniel Akaka on March 28, 2012. If enacted, S. 2249 would make adjustments to the 
SES pay system, reduce the ratio of noncareer to career senior executives, establish an SES 
Resource Office in the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and require agencies to enhance 
professional development opportunities for senior executives. Representative Jim Moran 
introduced H.R. 6042 on June 27, 2012, also titled the Senior Executive Service Reform Act. 
H.R. 6042 proposed similar changes to those proposed in the Senate bill, and would also require 
agencies to evaluate the skills and qualifications necessary for each SES position when it 
becomes vacant. In addition, H.R. 6042 would require agencies to establish an objective for 
holding executives accountable for addressing employee satisfaction. 
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